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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

February 23, 1962 DATE

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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 8

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MILITARY

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INTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Leadership. The dearth of activity -- or, at any rate, of any public evidence of activity -- on the part of most of the top leadership continued during the past week. The doings and whereabouts of BREZHNEV, KOZLOV, KUUSINEN, POLYANSKIY, SHVERNIK, SUSLOV, and VORONOV went unreported in the press.

KHRUSHCHEV, however, with MIKOYAN at his elbow, received the Indonesian Air Vice-Marshal, Omar DANI, and the Indonesian Ambassador, Adam MALIK, near Sochi on February 16, and TASS reported on February 19 that the two had also seen a Guinean politician, N'Famara KEITA, and the Guinean Ambassador, Caba SORY. Aware of rumors that he had been wounded in an attempted assassination, Khrushchev attempted to dispell these reports by his well-publicized reception on February 7 of the Brazilian Charge d'Affaires. Nevertheless, foreigners in Moscow are still encountering Russians who matter-of-factly hold to the story that Khrushchev had been attacked in Minsk.

First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. N. KOSYGIN continued to bear the brunt of the regime's protocol duties by putting in an appearance at a Nepalese Embassy reception on February 19. On the same day, in Kiev, Ukrainian CP First Secretary N. V. PODGORNYY opened an ideological conference -- next to agricultural conferences, currently the most fashionable kind to hold.

B. N. PONOMAREV, one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee, left Moscow on February 19, with a Party delegation, to visit North Vietnam at the invitation of the North Vietnamese CP's Central Committee. He was seen off at the airport by his fellow secretary, A. N. SHELEPIN.

2. Supreme Soviet Election: Registration of Candidates. Preparations for the March 18 Supreme Soviet election followed the established pattern. Candidates were being registered -- one to an election district. The registration process turned up a couple of interesting items.

N. G. IGNATOV, a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee for Agricultural Procurement, who lost his post as a member of the Presidium CC-CPSU at the XXII Congress, was registered as a candidate for the Soviet of the Union in Aleyskiy election district in Altay Kray (Pravda, February 17). In the expiring Supreme Soviet, Ignatov represents Sovetskiy election district of Gorkiy city. His new district is represented in the current Supreme Soviet by a man who, at the time of his election, was the first secretary of a Party rayon committee. Whether Ignatov's shift from Gorkiy city to the Altai portends a corresponding diminution in his status in the government that will be formed by the new Supreme Soviet, is a question for the future. He may come in for a share of the blame for the unhappy agricultural situation the country finds itself in.

Marshal S. K. TIMOSHENKO was registered as a candidate for the Soviet of Nationalities in Chimkent city district in Kazakhstan (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, February 15). Timoshenko, one of the outstanding Soviet military commanders of World War II, had been released from membership of the Bureau of the

Byelorussian Communist Party in July, 1960, and, at the same time, relieved as Commander of the Byelorussian Military District. He was, however, re-elected a candidate-member of the Central Committee CPSU on October 31, 1961. His reappearance now in Kazakhstan makes it appear that he, too, has been rusticated. The day before Kazakhstanskaya pravda reported his registration as a Supreme Soviet candidate, Krasnaya zvezda, the organ of the Ministry of Defense, in one of a series of articles purporting to correct the distortions introduced into the history of the armed forces during STALIN's reign, lumped him with Zhukov and Stalin as bearing "a fair share of the responsibility for the fact that the troops of our border districts were unprepared to rebuff the sudden attack of the enemy" in 1941. Timoshenko was, at the time, People's Commissar of Defense, having succeeded VOROSHILOV in that position a year earlier.

3. More Trouble with the Youth. The regime continues to have difficulty in making "new Communist men" out of its youth (WEEKA NO. 6, February 9, 1962).

The latest illustration of the difficulties it is having in this direction is a Georgian-operated examination-passing ring, whose operations were exposed in Komsomol'skaya Pravda on February 17:

The ring was operated as a "firm" by "Papasha," a balding but still young Georgian whose real name is Otar Grigoryevich PKHALADZE and who, until his recent arrest, was chief of a dietetic laboratory at the Professor Ganushkin Scientific Research Institute of Psychiatry in Moscow. "Papasha" sported a blue Volga sedan and was known in the Aragvi Restaurant as a heavy tipper. He was also a very busy man, receiving nocturnal telephone calls from Georgia, fat envelopes, and unknown visitors with suitcases.

With the help of students and academic personnel whom he had corrupted, "Papasha" was able to arrange for the sons and daughters of anxious and well-heeled parents to pass the entrance examinations of various Leningrad and Moscow educational institutions. "Papasha's" staff of professional examination-takers, using forged identification documents, would fulfill entrance requirements with a discreetly mediocre score--for a fee of 1,500 to 7,000 new rubles. Since "Papasha" had completed his undergraduate work in Tbilisi, it was only natural that his clients should be Georgians. Among them were D. M. TSATUROV, head of the "Samtrest" distillery, who paid 3,500 rubles for the examination of his son, SERGEY; Dr. Ye. N. EGNATOSHVILI, who paid 3,000; and a warehouse director in Borzhomi, who paid 4,000 rubles so that his son, Ye. KARAPETOV, might enter Moscow University. Many of the young men who entered higher educational institutions by these means were members of the Komsomol.

Unfortunately, one day somebody at the Leningrad Pediatric Institute unmasked one of "Papasha's" "sons," and the whole ring was soon exposed. "Papasha," by this time, had taken in 38,500 new rubles.

Komsomol'skaya Pravda's correspondent concludes that "Papasha" might even have bribed the patron goddess of science, Athena, if the idea had occurred to him. "Papasha," however, was arrested before he could complete the deal for a dacha he was buying, and is awaiting trial.

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

4. Soviet Foreign Relations. Dominant news themes in the foreign affairs field during the week were the successful US orbital space flight and international reactions to Khrushchev's proposal for a meeting at the summit level to launch the 18-member disarmament talks. Having heavily capitalized on the psychological effect of early Soviet space achievements as a basis for trying to change the balance of power to the detriment of the West and for the doctrine of the "changed correlation of forces" -- which also figures prominently in the Soviet-Chinese ideological dispute, the US orbital flight presented certain problems for Moscow. Likewise, it was apparent that there was not much neutral support for Khrushchev's proposal for an early summit meeting on disarmament, even though Soviet propaganda sought to create the impression that the opposite was the case.

5. Reaction to US Orbital Flight. Soviet public media promptly reported the essential details of the Glenn orbital flight and almost all papers carried photographs of Glenn. Mechanical troubles during the flight and the delays from December to February in launching it were highlighted. Reactions were eagerly reported from New York, London, and Tokyo which suggested that sober observers in those places did not interpret the flight as meaning that the US had caught up with the USSR in space technology. Soviet man-in-the-street reaction, however, seemed to be one of acceptance of the US achievement as on the same level with Soviet orbital flights.

6. Disarmament. Although the texts of the messages sent to Khrushchev by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on Feb. 14 have not as yet been published in the Soviet press, readers were informed through TASS news despatches that the two Western leaders had in fact rejected Khrushchev's suggestion that the negotiations in the 18-Nation disarmament committee open at the level of heads of government. Soviet commentators argued that the Western response in effect was short-sighted since the heads of government had the power and the authority to channel the course of the negotiations in the right direction by outlining the contents of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in rough form.

Favorable comments on the Khrushchev proposal gleaned from the foreign press were republished in one form or another in Soviet newspapers in an attempt to show that the proposal was being widely supported abroad, especially by public opinion. Messages of support from other bloc leaders whose countries are represented on the 18-Nation committee were carefully spaced throughout the week's press. One of the more interesting preliminary bloc reactions came from Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki who once more suggested that the implementation of certain partial measures could facilitate to the attainment of complete and general disarmament. Referring to the Polish draft resolution introduced at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly, Rapacki singled out proposals involving a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, and the abstention by great powers from further construction of rocket-nuclear basis on the territories of other states.

Indications at the end of the week were that the Soviets would continue to drum up support for the Khrushchev proposal in an effort to place pressure on President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to reverse their initial rejection of the suggestion made by Khrushchev.

7. Berlin/Germany. The air corridor crisis appeared in the Soviet press only in the form of vague allusions. The most specific of these was a brief TASS report on a statement by GDR Deputy Foreign Minister WINZER in which he pointed out that the Allied Control Council had agreed in 1945 to the need to review the air corridor question periodically.

The Izvestiya commentator POLYANOV published the fourth in his series of articles on the GROMYKO-THOMPSON talks on February 20. Polyanov maintained that hope for a fruitful exchange in the "Soviet-American dialogue," is rapidly dwindling. The article referred at three different points to the need to resolve the "border question," reiterated Soviet insistence that no resolution is possible which disregards GDR sovereignty, and condemned the US proposals for an International Autobahn Authority and all-Berlin solution as inacceptable and "thread-bare."

The question of Germany's borders also appeared in several other press articles which emphasized that the present "borders" (including the Elbe-Werra border between the GDR and the FRG) are immutable. Refusal to accept this, the articles stated, constitutes dangerous support for West German revanchism. The sudden attention to this question contrasts with its virtually total absence from prior Soviet press commentaries.

On February 21 West German Ambassador KROLL, [redacted] b1

8. Soviet-Chinese Affairs. On February 21 Pravda's lead editorial discussed bloc unity in general terms, but in a way which suggests that Soviet-Chinese tension is mounting. The main theme was that the dominance of communism in the contemporary international scene is axiomatic and that those who are counting on a split in the bloc are indulging in wishful thinking. But the editorial placed revisionism and dogmatism on a par as dangers to the international movement without any of the usual qualifications about the relativity of these dangers. The article was reminiscent of Pravda editorials in the period following Stalin's death which argued that the CPSU was solid and monolithic and which preceded major developments in the Soviet internal power struggle of that time.

9. Latin America. The Soviet Government Declaration of February 19 reaffirming Soviet solidarity with the CASTRO regime brought the subject of Cuba back into the limelight in the Soviet press. While the Declaration recalled Khrushchev's conditional pledge to come to Cuba's assistance in the event of attacks against her and introduced a warning that the USSR can bring pressure against US foreign bases, nevertheless it avoided a categoric commitment. The Declaration also argued pointedly, as has most press material on Cuba, that Latin American popular opinion opposes the anti-Cuba policies adopted by a majority of the governments of the continent.

As part of the campaign to minimize the significance of the OAS actions adopted at Punta del Este, the Soviet press has also again attacked the governments of Central America as military dictatorships and US puppets. Special attention has been given to Nicaragua and Guatemala.

The outbreak of anti-JAGAN riots in Georgetown was attributed to anti-popular movements financed and armed by the US. The Soviet press, which had earlier heralded Jagan's election victory had difficulty in explaining the mass demonstrations against him. These were attributed to racial incitement by reactionary circles who apparently desired to postpone the achievement of full independence.

10. Congo. Gbenye's appointment to the post of Vice Premier of the Congo was interpreted by the Soviet press as a maneuver designed to remove him as head of the ministry of interior where he controlled the police of the country. In other commentary, it was made clear that the Soviets did not intend to subscribe to the special loan being floated to cover expenditures of UN troop operations in the Congo. Soviet commentators repeated the old theme that UN troop operations against Tshombe were really under the control of US diplomacy and that the UN flag was being used as a cover for imperialist aggression against the Congolese.

MILITARY

Negative

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Boris H. Klosson

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Counselor for Political Affairs

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